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PRIVILEGE, AND LEGAL ETHICS:
AN EXAMINATION AND
SUGGESTION FOR ALASKA 
This Note addresses the ethical and attorney-client privilege issues
that arise when a confidential document is inadvertently disclosed
by one attorney to another.  The Author examines the three most
common approaches taken by courts in determining whether the
attorney-client privilege has been waived in inadvertent disclosure
situations, considers the positions taken by the American Bar As-
sociation and various state ethics opinions, and examines current
Alaska law regarding waiver and professional ethics.  The Author
concludes by recommending that Alaska take the position that in-
advertent disclosure does not waive the attorney-client privilege in
most circumstances.  Accordingly, the Author proposes that
Alaska adopt a non-binding professional guideline stating that
lawyers faced with such a situation should refrain from using the
inadvertently disclosed document, notify the adversary of the
mistake, and follow the adversary’s instructions regarding what to
do with the document.
I.  INTRODUCTION
In today’s world of technology and increased efficiency, the
demands of a fast-paced environment can take their toll.  One click
of the mouse, and the email is sent; one push of the button, and the
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fax is sent; one overlooked document in a box, and it is inadver-
tently produced.  Opportunities for efficiency in legal representa-
tion are increasing, but along with them comes the danger of inad-
vertently disclosing privileged documents, and possibly even
inadvertently waiving the attorney-client privilege.  Currently,
there is no rule in Alaska governing whether inadvertent disclosure
waives the attorney-client privilege, or how opposing counsel
should handle misdirected documents.
This Note first examines the three most prevalent ways of de-
termining whether the attorney-client privilege has been waived as
a result of inadvertent disclosure.1  Second, it looks at how these
waiver approaches inform the actions of the receiving attorney by
comparing the position taken by the American Bar Association
(ABA) and some representative state opinions.  Next, the Note ex-
amines potential philosophical arguments that may favor one ap-
proach over another and discusses current Alaska law regarding
waiver and professional ethics.  The Note concludes by suggesting
that Alaska take the position that inadvertent disclosure does not
waive the attorney-client privilege in most circumstances and adopt
a professional guideline based on considerations of ethics and pro-
fessionalism.
An attorney’s behavior is governed by the state’s rules of pro-
fessional responsibility, while the rules of evidence govern the at-
torney-client privilege and its waiver.2  In other words, the rules of
evidence govern what may be admitted into evidence; the rules of
professional conduct impose discipline for negligent or reckless be-
havior on the part of lawyers.  In general, violations of privilege
rules do not prohibit derivative use of the information.3  For exam-
ple, a lawyer who learns certain facts from inadvertently disclosed
privileged material may make derivative use of those facts at trial,
even if the attorney-client privilege has not been waived.  A rule of
ethics may ask the lawyer to “forget” what she read, with an added
threat of sanctions if she does not.
While the rules of evidence and professional responsibility are
separate, they have an effect on one another.  The way the court
rules on matters of inadvertent disclosure of privileged material
under the rules of evidence influences whether the attorney can be
sanctioned under the professional rules of conduct for breach of
confidentiality4 or for unfairness to opposing parties and counsel.5
1. For purposes of this paper, the Author assumes the inadvertently disclosed
document is privileged.
2. See ALASKA R. EVID. § 503; see also FED. R. EVID. § 501.
3. See, e.g., ALASKA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2001-2002).
4. Id.; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2000).
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Furthermore, some of the justifications for the inadvertent disclo-
sure rules rest upon notions of professionalism that are outlined in
the rules of professional responsibility.  So, while the rules of evi-
dence may allow the admission of material that would otherwise be
protected by the attorney-client privilege, any discussion involving
the use by attorneys or courts of that privileged material necessar-
ily involves reference to attorney behavior and what the profession
expects from attorneys when they are dealing with privileged mate-
rial.  Thus, the test that Alaska adopts to govern inadvertent disclo-
sure should be influenced by considerations of confidentiality and
zealous representation, which are governed by the Alaska Rules of
Professional Conduct.
II.  THREE COMMON WAIVER APPROACHES TO
INADVERTENT DISCLOSURE
There are three basic approaches to inadvertent disclosure of
otherwise privileged documents.6  The first is a strict responsibility
approach, where any disclosure constitutes a waiver of the attor-
ney-client privilege.7  The second is the no waiver approach,
whereby the client’s intent to waive the attorney-client privilege
governs absolutely, leading to the result that no inadvertent disclo-
sure can result in waiver since inadvertent disclosures are, by defi-
nition, unintended.8  The third is a balancing approach that exam-
ines the facts surrounding the disclosure.9  Each of the three
approaches will be examined in light of the goals of ease of applica-
tion, professionalism, fairness to the parties, respect for confidenti-
ality and the attorney-client privilege, and respect for a lawyer’s
obligation to zealously represent his or her client.  As noted above,
although these goals do not decide the admissibility of evidence,
the opinions behind them (which arise out of the rules of profes-
sional conduct) help determine what evidentiary rule of inadver-
5. ALASKA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (2001-2002); see also MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (2000).
6. For discussions of the three traditional approaches to the problem of inad-
vertent disclosure, see generally Audrey Rogers, New Insights on Waiver and the
Inadvertent Disclosure of Privileged Materials: Attorney Responsibility as the Gov-
erning Precept, 47 FLA. L. REV. 159 (1995); Anne G. Bruckner-Harvey, Inadver-
tent Disclosure in the Age of Fax Machines: Is the Cat Really Out of the Bag?, 46
BAYLOR L. REV. 385 (1994); James M. Grippando, Attorney-Client Privilege: Im-
plied Waiver Through Inadvertent Disclosure of Documents, 39 U. MIAMI L. REV.
511 (1985).
7. See infra Part II.A.
8. See infra Part II.C.
9. See infra Part II.E.
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tent disclosure and waiver of the attorney-client privilege should be
adopted.  For purposes of this Note, it will be assumed that the
document is privileged on its face—that is, there is a cover sheet
naming the sender and intended recipient, as well as a notice of
confidentiality and a request to immediately return the document
to the sender if it has been mistakenly sent.
A. The Strict Responsibility Approach
Under the strict responsibility approach, as set out by Dean
Wigmore10 and in a number of federal11 and state opinions,12 inad-
vertent disclosure of a privileged document automatically waives
the attorney-client privilege.13  Under this approach, disclosure it-
self is deemed evidence of the client’s intent not to keep the infor-
mation privileged.14  Because attorneys have implied authority to
disclose confidential information in order to carry out their duties
in representing clients, if a document is disclosed, regardless of
whether it is stamped confidential, the client implicitly gave the at-
torney authority to disclose it, and the client cannot then object if
the document was inadvertently disclosed.15  Furthermore, oppos-
ing counsel may use the document derivatively to obtain leads to
other previously unknown sources and may also use the document
itself as evidence.
The strict responsibility approach certainly has the benefit of
ease of application.  There is no need for a lawyer or judge to exer-
cise moral discretion regarding what to do if a document is missent
as the disclosure itself is deemed to evidence a lack of intent to
keep the document confidential.16  Because the privilege is waived,
10. JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, 8 EVIDENCE § 2292 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
11. See, e.g., Carter v. Gibbs, 909 F.2d 1450, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1990); In re Sealed
Case, 877 F.2d 976, 978-79 (D.C. Cir. 1989); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 727
F.2d 1352, 1355 (4th Cir. 1984); In re Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 80-82 (2d Cir. 1973);
Harmony Gold U.S.A., Inc. v. FASA Corp., 169 F.R.D. 113, 116 (N.D. Ill. 1996);
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Singh, 140 F.R.D. 252, 253 (D. Me. 1992).
12. See, e.g., Farm Credit Bank of St. Paul v. Huether, 454 N.W.2d 710, 722
(N.D. 1990); Aerojet-Gen. Corp. v. Transp. Indem. Ins., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 866
(Cal. Ct. App. 1993); Maine Prof’l Ethics Comm. Op. No. 146 (Dec. 9, 1994); Ohio
Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances and Discipline Op. No. 93-11 (Dec. 3, 1993).
13. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d at 980.
14. See Carter, 909 F.2d at 1451.
15. ALASKA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2001-2002); see also MODEL
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2000).
16. See Int’l Digital Sys. Corp. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 120 F.R.D. 445, 449-50
(D. Mass. 1988) (explaining that the court, in evaluating if a privilege was waived,
need not look at the precautions taken by the party who inadvertently produced
SIMKO_FINAL.DOC 11/06/02  9:39 AM
2002] INADVERTENT DISCLOSURE 465
receiving counsel can (and in the view of some, should)17 use the
document.  There is nothing for the judge to decide, other than the
common questions of relevance and admissibility.18  Under this ap-
proach, the document itself can be admitted into evidence as long
as it is relevant.  The presence of a cover sheet claiming confidenti-
ality is ineffective because the only inquiry is whether a disclosure
took place, regardless of circumstances or intent.19
Professionalism, under the strict responsibility approach, cen-
ters on tight control over the litigation by the lawyer, and relin-
quishment of a client’s right if there is negligence in handling
privileged documents.  The lawyer’s duty is first and foremost to
her client, and professionalism would mandate doing everything
within the rules to further the interests of the client.  Generally, the
professional lawyer does not have a duty to protect her adversary
from her own mistakes.  In International Digital Systems Corp. v.
Digital Equipment Corp.,20 the court reasoned that the strict liabil-
ity approach “would probably do more than anything else to instill
in attorneys the need for effective precautions against such disclo-
sure.”21  In other words, this approach enhances professionalism
because it reminds the attorney of the care that must be taken with
her client’s documents.  As one court put it, confidential or privi-
leged documents must be treated “like jewels—if not crown jew-
els”22 by the lawyer who pays attention to high professional stan-
dards.
The strict responsibility approach implies that fairness to the
parties is in the open pursuit of justice, and that the narrower the
privilege, the greater the chance justice will be served.  This ap-
proach embodies a utilitarian philosophy that favors the search for
truth over confidentiality.23 A broad judicial approach to privileges
privileged documents, nor at the party’s intent: “unforced disclosure is disclosure,”
and the privilege is waived) (quoting In re Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 77 B.R.
324, 330 (D. Mass. 1987)).
17. See Monroe Freedman, The Errant Fax, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 23, 1995, at 26
(supporting the use of documents inadvertently received by facsimile).
18. See ALASKA R. EVID. §§ 401-403; see also FED. R. EVID. §§ 401-403.
19. Diana P. Scott, Inadvertent Disclosure of Documents: Penalties and Reme-
dies, American Law Institute – American Bar Association Continuing Legal Edu-
cation ALI-ABA Course of Study, July 26-28, 2001, at 1297, 1310.
20. 120 F.R.D. 445 (D. Mass. 1988).
21. Id. at 450.
22. In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989).
23. That privileges are in derogation of the truth is perhaps the strongest ar-
gument against them.  See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 18 (1996) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
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is often criticized because it is said that privileges are in derogation
of the truth, and tend to conceal relevant evidence in a way that of-
ten compromises justice.24  Furthermore, some commentators be-
lieve that “the priorities underlying the traditional confidentiality
rationale are ‘perverse’ because they categorically favor clients
who withhold information out of irresponsible or guilty motives at
the expense of innocent third parties.”25  In other words, a prefer-
ence for confidentiality benefits those clients who conceal informa-
tion as to their guilt or culpability, and harms those who are forth-
right with their information.  These are forceful arguments, and the
strict responsibility approach would suggest that the narrower the
privilege, the more likely it is that the parties will obtain a fair ad-
judication of their dispute, since the truth will be revealed and the
party with the better case will likely prevail.
Adherents to the strict responsibility approach would contend
that its application affords as much or as little respect for confiden-
tiality and the attorney-client privilege as attorneys see fit to give
them.  If privileged documents are to be treated as “crown jew-
els,”26 then inadvertent disclosure suggests that the lawyer has vio-
lated her duty.  Courts have also noted that the strict responsibility
approach is not inconsistent with the policy of the attorney-client
privilege, since there is no need for the privilege once the opposing
party knows the contents of the privileged communication.27
24. See, e.g., id. at 24 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (examining the effect of psycho-
therapist-patient privilege); Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981) (ex-
plaining that a broad approach to privileges imposes “severe burdens on discov-
ery”).  The utilitarian philosopher Jeremy Bentham also argued against privileges,
believing that they thwarted justice and that society would be better off without
them, since the guilty would be put in jail.  If confidences become less frequent,
then “a guilty person will not in general be able to derive quite so much assistance
from his law adviser, in the way of concerting a false defence, as he may do at pre-
sent.”  DEBORAH L. RHODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE
PERVASIVE METHOD 225 (2d ed. 1998) (citing JEREMY BENTHAM, 5 RATIONALE
OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 302-304 (Hunt & Clarke eds., 1827)).
25. RHODE, supra note 24, at 227 (quoting William Simon, Ethical Discretion
in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083, 1142 (1988)).
26. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
27. United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461, 464-65 (E.D.
Mich. 1954); see also Carter v. Gibbs, 909 F.2d 1450, 1451 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (stating
that inadvertent disclosure “defeat[s] the policy underlying the privilege” and to
find there was no waiver “would do no more than seal the bag from which the cat
had already esacaped”); In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d at 980 (stating that the court
would “grant no greater protection to those who assert the privilege than their
own precautions warrant”).
SIMKO_FINAL.DOC 11/06/02  9:39 AM
2002] INADVERTENT DISCLOSURE 467
Finally, the lawyer’s duty of zealous advocacy is perhaps the
strongest argument in favor of the strict responsibility approach.  It
is not the receiving lawyer’s responsibility to maintain the attorney-
client privilege for his adversary, and a zealous advocate would
perhaps say that anything that has been disclosed is fair game.28  If
an attorney does not want an adversary to use information she con-
siders confidential, she should take care not to disclose it in the first
place.
B. Criticism of the Strict Responsibility Approach
Although the strict responsibility approach is easy to apply, it
fails to treat the values of professionalism and fairness to the par-
ties seriously.  In the view of adherents to the strict responsibility
approach, lawyers are no more than mercenaries for their clients—
the ultimate good for a lawyer is what the client says and if the cli-
ent says to use a document that was inadvertently disclosed, that is
the end of the story.  Professor Monroe Freedman, an outspoken
advocate for this type of unrestrained adversarialism,29 suggests
that the client is the ultimate voice in determining whether or not
information should be revealed.30  But when one examines the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (Model Rules) and the rules
regarding discovery, one finds that the client’s view is only a small
part of a much larger story.
The Model Rules place limits on zealous advocacy in the name
of fairness and justice.  For example, the comment to Model Rule
3.3 states that “[t]he advocate’s task is to present the client’s case
with persuasive force.  Performance of that duty while maintaining
confidences of the client is qualified by the advocate’s duty of can-
dor to the tribunal.”31  A lawyer may not counsel a client in crimi-
nal or fraudulent conduct.32  Furthermore, the rules of discovery
mandate the exchange of documents pertinent to a lawyer’s repre-
sentation of a client.33  Even Freedman presumably would not sug-
gest that the client could stop his lawyer from complying with dis-
28. See Freedman, supra note 17, at 45.
29. Id.  Professor Freedman is famous in part for his position that criminal de-
fense attorneys have a duty to put their clients on the stand even if they know the
client will commit perjury.
30. MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAYWERS’ ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM
27 (1975).
31. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.3 cmt. (2000).
32. Id. R. 1.2(d) (1998).
33. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26, 37.
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covery by withholding consent.34  But it would leave any conduct
not proscribed by a rule subject to the client’s whim.  The result, as
one critic of Freedman noted, is that if “my adversary left a file in
my office I am not only required to look at it but also I could not
return it without my client’s consent . . . .  I could not even tell my
adversary that I have the file which he or she left—even if he or she
called and asked!” 35  It seems zealous advocacy is tantamount to a
“finders keepers” rule.  One could even argue it is like refusing to
return a found purse to its rightful owner on the reasoning that “if
you really wanted to keep it, you would have taken more care of
it.”36  Adherence to the principle of zealous advocacy at the ex-
pense of all else leads to absurd results.
It is more difficult to criticize the strict responsibility approach
when one considers the fairness to both parties.  On the one hand,
when the receiving party obtains a document, issues may open up
that he or she had not thought to pursue, or the document may
provide the missing link of evidence required to clinch the case.  In
such a scenario, allowing use of the document seems fair, as per-
haps it would lead to the most just result.  On the other hand, one
can just as easily imagine a situation in which one party inadver-
tently discloses the amount for which he would be willing to set-
tle—possibly even an amount less than what the case is really
worth, or less than the opposing party would have been willing to
pay.  If the receiving party is the one at fault in the litigation, the
strict responsibility approach may lead to an unjust result in those
circumstances.
Furthermore, the utilitarian philosophy relied upon to justify
narrowing the scope of privileges and used to support strict respon-
sibility concerning inadvertent disclosure is not the only way to ex-
amine fairness and justice in the legal system.  If one accepts that
an overarching goal of the legal system is the preservation of indi-
vidual rights, then utilitarians are “wrong in supposing that only the
guilty benefit from the lawyer-client privilege.”37  There are circum-
stances in which an innocent party may fear disclosure of informa-
34. It is important to note that various rules of discovery and evidence do
serve to circumscribe “zealous” advocacy.  Trina Jones, Inadvertent Disclosure of
Privileged Information and the Law of Mistake: Using Substantive Legal Principles
to Guide Ethical Decision-Making, 48 EMORY L.J. 1255, 1290-91 (1999).
35. Bertram Perkel, “Errant Fax” Argument Proves Too Simplistic, LEGAL
TIMES, Feb. 6, 1995, at 33.
36. See RICHARD A. ZITRIN & CAROL M. LANGFORD, LEGAL ETHICS IN THE
PRACTICE OF LAW 111-12 (1995).
37. RHODE, supra note 24, at 226.
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tion despite its being legally helpful.38  Also, under a rights-based
approach to privileges, justice is ensured not because all the infor-
mation is “out there,” but because individual legal rights are safe-
guarded and “certain specific entitlements including privacy, effec-
tive assistance of counsel, and the protection against self-
incrimination” are preserved.39  The rules of privilege ensure the
criminally accused the full exercise of their Sixth Amendment right
to counsel and their Fifth Amendment right against self-
incrimination.40
The strict responsibility approach also punishes the client for
the attorney’s mistake.  Although the attorney-client privilege be-
longs to the client, and ostensibly only the client’s intentional ac-
tion can waive the privilege,41 most jurisdictions recognize that the
attorney can waive the right on behalf of the client.42  Ironically, al-
though  the client’s affirmative intent is often required to waive the
privilege, the strict responsibility approach allows an attorney’s
mere negligence to waive the privilege.43  For example, under the
strict responsibility approach, even if the attorney’s secretary acci-
dentally pushed the wrong speed-dial button, the client would lose
the privilege.  It seems unjust to punish the client so harshly be-
cause of a third party’s clerical mistake.
Furthermore, if the client is aware that his attorney could in-
advertently waive the privilege, the client may decide to keep some
information to himself, thwarting the policy of the free flow of in-
formation that lies behind the attorney-client privilege.  The strict
responsibility view also fails to recognize that “unprofessional or
sloppy conduct may not have been the cause of the disclosure.”44
38. Id. (citing FREEDMAN, supra note 30, at 4 (discussing the case of a battered
wife who is afraid to acknowledge shooting her brutal husband because she is un-
aware that her act would qualify as self-defense)).
39. Id.
40. Id.  However, it should be noted that the rights-based view has been criti-
cized: “[C]oncerns about individual privacy and autonomy [do not] explain the
extension of such confidentiality protections to corporations.  More fundamen-
tally, it is not self-evident why the rights of clients should always take priority over
the rights of others, particularly where health and safety interests are implicated.”
Id. at 226-27.
41. ALASKA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Scope; Jones, supra note 34, at 1276.
42. Rogers, supra note 6, at 164-65 (“An attorney, designated by the client as
his agent to comply with a document production request, is deemed to have im-
plicit authority to waive the client’s privilege.”) (citing Goldsborough v. Eagle
Crest Partners, Ltd., 838 P.2d 1069, 1073 (Or. 1992)).
43. RHODE, supra note 24, at 233; see also Rogers, supra note 6, at 189.
44. Rogers, supra note 6, at 190 (citing Wichita Land & Cattle Co. v. Am. Fed.
Bank, 148 F.R.D. 456, 457-58 (1992)).
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The highly professional and careful attorney and her client are
punished for one mistake out of a thousand.  Lawyers are humans,
and it is unrealistic to expect perfection with every document every
time, especially in light of complex litigation with the potential
production of hundreds of thousands of documents.
Finally, the strict responsibility approach, when taken together
with the broad discovery rules, encourages abuse.  Lawyers in
complex litigation could request many unnecessary documents in
the hopes that a privileged one will slip through the cracks.  Dis-
covery costs would rise, and the party with the most money could
wear down the opponent with this pretrial tactic.  Given that dis-
covery is already often abused, the strict responsibility approach to
inadvertent waiver only provides an incentive that exacerbates the
problem.
C. The No Waiver Approach
The opposite of the strict responsibility approach is the no
waiver approach.45  Under this approach, the client’s intent matters
the most, and because a client does not intend to waive the attor-
ney-client privilege when a document is inadvertently disclosed, the
privilege is not waived.46  Like the strict responsibility approach,
the no waiver approach is easy to apply, and relieves the judge of
any burdens in deciding the issue.  However, adopting the no
waiver approach would not have the effect of increasing profes-
sionalism.  Although one may not wish to punish the otherwise me-
ticulous lawyer who has made a mistake, one also may not want to
reward the sloppy lawyer who does not take care of her client’s
sensitive documents.  However, lawyers still have an interest in
protecting privileged documents from adversaries.  Although those
documents may not be admissible as evidence, the information
contained in them can be used for strategic purposes during trial.47
45. See, e.g., Berg Elecs., Inc. v. Molex, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 261 (D. Del. 1995);
Fleet Nat’l Bank v. Tonneson & Co., 150 F.R.D. 10 (D. Mass. 1993); Am. Special
Risk Ins. Co. v. Delta Am. Re Ins. Co., 836 F. Supp. 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1993); Hydra-
flow, Inc. v. Enidine Inc., 145 F.R.D. 626 (W.D.N.Y. 1993).
46. Bruckner-Harvey, supra note 6, at 391 (“The rationale behind this ap-
proach is that waiver should be defined as the ‘intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right [and] [i]nadvertent production is the antithesis of
that concept.’”) (quoting Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951, 955
(N.D. Ill. 1982)).
47. Id. at 392 (stating that “while a recipient may not be allowed to keep the
document or introduce it into evidence, he still receives a windfall from the mere
knowledge of its contents”).
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Because the no waiver approach tracks the intent of the client,
it appears more fair to the parties than the strict responsibility ap-
proach, and it has a higher regard for confidentiality and for the at-
torney-client privilege.  In contrast to the strict responsibility ap-
proach, under the no waiver approach, the client is not punished
for his attorney’s negligence.  Thus, the no waiver approach avoids
what one court called the “harsh results out of all proportion to the
mistake of inadvertent disclosure.”48  The no waiver approach has
been held to further the policy of the attorney-client privilege by
ensuring that the client “remains free from apprehension that con-
sultations with a legal advisor will be disclosed.”49  One court has
reasoned that “[a]n uncertain privilege is . . . little better than no
privilege at all”50 and that the no waiver approach is necessary to
“serve the interests of justice by encouraging clients to consult with
counsel free from the apprehension of disclosure.”51  Clearly, this
approach values confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege
more than it does the open search for truth.  It is thus more of an
individual rights-based approach to litigation than a utilitarian ap-
proach.
The no waiver approach does not hamper zealous advocacy
any more than the attorney-client privilege does.52  Although the
receiving attorney may not introduce inadvertently disclosed
documents into evidence, this is no greater an imposition than if
the documents remained undisclosed.53  Furthermore, under this
approach, receiving attorneys may still use the information gleaned
from those documents in preparing strategies on behalf of their cli-
ents.54
D. Criticism of the No Waiver Approach
Like the strict responsibility approach, the no waiver approach
has also been criticized.  The premium it places on confidentiality
and the preservation of the attorney-client privilege comes at the
cost of lawyer responsibility.55  If there is no threat of waiver or
sanctions, the lawyer has no incentive to protect her client’s confi-
48. Mendenhall, 531 F. Supp. at 955.
49. Berg Elecs., 875 F. Supp. at 261-62 (citing Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464,
470 (1888)).
50. Id. at 262 (citing In re von Bulow, 828 F.2d 94, 100 (2d Cir. 1987)).
51. Id.
52. See Bruckner-Harvey, supra note 6, at 392.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See Rogers, supra note 6, at 191.
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dential documents.56  The result is a license for sloppy management.
The lawyers could actually save their clients money by not taking
the time to ensure that privileged documents are not disclosed.
Lawyers may also not be as vigilant in maintaining client confi-
dences, since there are no evidentiary consequences in the event of
disclosure.57  Although the client may have recourse if privileged
material is disclosed,58 the client must then bear the burden of en-
forcement.  Moreover, under the no waiver approach, the burden is
placed on the recipient of the privileged materials to maintain the
confidentiality of an opponent’s attorney-client privilege.59  Surely,
an attorney cannot be responsible for guarding the privileges of her
adversaries.  Under the no waiver approach, even if the sending at-
torney did not take the relatively minor precaution of attaching a
“confidential” cover sheet to the missent document, the receiving
attorney would have to assume the document was not for her and
try to “forget” the material she had read before discovering that
the document had been missent.60  Of course, the lawyer would
have to “forget” the material only if an ethical rule mandated it,
because the rules of evidence allow a lawyer to use the facts con-
tained therein, while prohibiting only the introduction of the
document into evidence.  Zealous representation, then, is watered-
down on both sides of the litigation, since one lawyer has fewer in-
centives to protect privileged documents, and the other is prohib-
ited from using inadvertently disclosed evidence for the client’s
benefit at trial.
E. The Balancing Test Approach
The balancing test evaluates the circumstances surrounding
the inadvertent disclosure to determine whether the attorney-client
privilege has been waived.61  In the event of inadvertent disclosure,
courts using this approach often apply the five-factor test set out in
Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & Co., which consid-
ers:  (1) the reasonableness of the precautions taken to prevent in-
advertent disclosure; (2) the time taken to rectify the error; (3) the
scope of the discovery; (4) the extent of the disclosure; and (5) the
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Dorthea Beane & Heath Nailos, Inadvertent Disclosure of Attorney-Client
Privileged Material: Putting the Horse Back in the Barn, FLA. B.J., Oct. 1995, at 67.
59. See Rogers, supra note 6, at 191.
60. See Beane & Nailos, supra note 58, at 67.
61. See generally United States v. Billmyer, 57 F.3d 31 (1st Cir. 1995); All-
dread v. City of Grenada, 988 F.2d 1425 (5th Cir. 1993); Rotelli v. 7-Up Bottling
Co. of Phila., 32 Fed. R. Serv. 3d 82 (E.D. Pa. 1995).
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overarching issue of fairness and the protection of an appropriate
privilege, judged against whether the privilege is guarded with care
and diligence or negligence and indifference.62  All of these factors
tend to bleed together, but they provide useful guidelines for as-
sessing whether the attorney-client privilege was waived.
In examining the first Lois Sportswear factor—the reasonable-
ness of the precautions taken—courts look at the mechanics of the
document disclosure, considering whether the disclosing party had
a screening process in place to sort out privileged material, how the
screening process was staffed, and what kind of legal expertise the
staffers possessed.63  Thus, this factor attempts both to maintain in-
centives for the attorney to protect the privilege and to avoid pun-
ishing the client for attorney negligence.  The more careful the at-
torney, the less likely the court is to find waiver.
As to the second factor—the time taken to rectify the error—
the less time taken, the more likely the court is to maintain the
privilege.64  Some courts begin their analysis at the time of the in-
advertent disclosure,65 while others begin when the disclosing party
realizes the mistake.66  If the receiving attorney refuses to return
the document upon request, the usual way for an attorney to ad-
dress the inadvertent disclosure is a motion for protective order.67
Thus, the second factor is a way of measuring attorney negli-
gence—the more prompt the action, the less negligence the court
will likely find.
The third factor, unique to the context of document produc-
tion during discovery, examines the scope of the discovery request.
The greater the scope of discovery, the more lenient the court will
likely be when there is inadvertent disclosure.68  The number of in-
advertent disclosures is often compared to the number of docu-
62. 104 F.R.D. 103, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
63. Rogers, supra note 6, at 172 (citing Lois Sportswear, 104 F.R.D. at 105; In
re Grand Jury Investigation, 142 F.R.D. 276, 279-80 (M.D.N.C. 1992); and Fed.
Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Marine Midland Realty, 138 F.R.D. 479, 483(E.D. Va. 1991);
see also Jones, supra note 34, at 1273 n.62 (“In nearly every case where the court
determines that reasonable precautions were in place, the privilege is maintained.
In every case where the court determines that reasonable precautions were not
taken, the privilege is waived.”).
64. See Jones, supra note 34, at 1273-74 n.6.
65. See, e.g., Central Die Casting & Mfg. Co. v. Tokheim Corp., No. 93-C-
7692, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11411, at *14 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 15, 1994).
66. See, e.g., Edward Lowe Indus. v. Oil-Dri Corp., No. 94-C7568, 1995 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 9580, at *12 (N.D. Ill. July 10, 1995).
67. See Rogers, supra note 6, at 174.
68. See Jones, supra note 34, at 1274 n.64.
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ments produced.69  The case of Transamerica Computer Co., Inc. v.
International Business Machines Corp.70 provides a good illustra-
tion.  In that case, a pretrial order accelerated document produc-
tion requiring IBM to inspect and copy “approximately 17 million
pages of documents” for their opponents within a three-month pe-
riod.71  Despite a “herculean effort to review and produce the ma-
terial,”72 IBM inadvertently disclosed 1,138 documents totaling ap-
proximately 5,800 pages.73  Although the court resolved the issue by
holding that the attorney-client privilege is not waived when a
party is compelled to produce documents,74 in dicta, the court
strongly suggested that the extent of the production and the num-
ber of documents inadvertently disclosed are factors to consider in
determining the reasonableness of the lawyer’s precautions.75
In examining the fourth factor—the extent of the disclosure—
courts look at whether the receiving attorney has learned the con-
tents of the document or has merely learned of the document’s ex-
istence.76  If the attorney has only limited knowledge of the con-
tents, there is a greater chance that the court will maintain the
privilege.77  In other words, there is an incentive for the disclosing
attorney to act as quickly as possible, before the opponent has ex-
amined the document.
The fifth and final Lois Sportswear factor is a catch-all provi-
sion that looks to underlying considerations of fairness.  At this
stage of the inquiry, courts will often examine the unique circum-
stances of a particular case that would justify either maintaining or
waiving the privilege.78  Courts have generally employed the fair-
ness doctrine as a means of considering the policy issues underlying
the operation of the attorney-client privilege.  For example, in one
case, the court concluded that the attorney-client privilege had
been waived as to the contents of a number of inadvertently dis-
closed letters where there was no evidence that the disclosing at-
torney had taken any precautions to prevent inadvertent disclosure
and had not previously objected to the use of those letters by the
69. Id.
70. 573 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1978).
71. Id. at 648.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 650.
74. Id. at 650-51.
75. Id. at 652.
76. Rogers, supra note 6, at 173-74.
77. Jones, supra note 34, at 1274 n.65.
78. See id. at 1274 n.66.; see also Rogers, supra note 6, at 175.
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opposing attorney in depositions and for other purposes.79  The
court concluded that it would be unfair to reward the careless be-
havior of the disclosing attorney by maintaining the privilege.80  In
another case, however, the court determined that the privilege had
not been waived because the court believed that it would be unfair
to punish the client for its attorney’s mistake where the attorney
had made every effort to prevent disclosure of privileged informa-
tion and had been diligent in seeking to rectify the inadvertent dis-
closure.81  Both cases indicate that courts tend to use the fairness
factor to justify their “gut” feelings about the fairness of the situa-
tion and to reward attentive attorneys and to punish sloppy law-
yering.
The balancing test is not as easy to apply as the other tests,
and the closer one gets to the gray areas, the less likely one would
be able to predict a court’s ruling.  But what the balancing test
lacks in ease of application, it appears to make up for in the areas
of professionalism and fairness to the parties.  Because the test fo-
cuses on the actions of the disclosing attorney,82 there are powerful
incentives for attorneys to exercise the utmost care and profession-
alism when screening documents, to remedy any inadvertent dis-
closures, and to be cautious about the number of documents pro-
duced.83  Thus, the balancing test attempts to maintain high levels
of professionalism while allowing room for human error.  Attor-
neys who are careful are rewarded for their care, and clients are
protected from negligence on their attorney’s part.84
Furthermore, the balancing test retains a high level of respect
for both the attorney-client privilege and the lawyer’s duty to zeal-
ously represent the client.  The balancing test approach promotes
“fair administration of each case . . . [and has] systemic benefits to
society.”85  Not only are clients assured that they will not be pun-
ished for potentially minor human errors, but careless attorneys are
also not relieved of the consequences of their carelessness “if the
circumstances surrounding the disclosure do not clearly demon-
79. Edwards v. Whitaker, 868 F. Supp. 226, 229 (M.D. Tenn. 1994).
80. Id.
81. Monarch Cement v. Lone Star Industries, Inc., 132 F.R.D. 558, 560 (D.
Kan. 1990).
82. See Rogers, supra note 6, at 194-97.
83. Id. at 195.  Rogers asserts that the balancing test should discourage docu-
ment “dumping” as a litigation strategy, since such an attempt could be examined
under the “overall fairness” prong of the test, and the more documents “dumped,”
the more likely there will be inadvertent disclosures.  Id.
84. Id. at 196.
85. Id.
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strate that continued protection is warranted.”86  Furthermore, the
balancing test approach protects receiving parties by assuring them
that they will not be deprived of documents in their possession that
are not marked confidential simply because a lawyer later wants to
claim that they are confidential, as would be the case under the no
waiver approach.  Derivative use of the information by the receiv-
ing party is permissible under the balancing test approach, as well.
If a court finds that the privilege has been waived, the document
itself will be admissible into evidence—the same result as under the
strict responsibility approach.
F. Criticism of the Balancing Test
The central criticism of the balancing test is its unpredictabil-
ity.87  Even if the receiving attorney knows the court will apply the
balancing test, “she may lack sufficient information upon which to
rest a conclusion because the balancing test turns on the precau-
tions taken by the other side.”88  And, even if a receiving attorney
were aware of the other side’s actions, she would not be able to
predict how a court would apply the balancing test to her situation.
The balancing test approach can also result in higher litigation
costs, since the factors would all be “subject to a hearing and litiga-
tion, which would require the production of witnesses and evi-
dence.”89  The attorneys would be forced to spend time and re-
sources researching and preparing for trial on the issue of waiver,
rather than on the central issues of the case, and these costs would
be passed on to the client.  Furthermore, one could argue that such
procedures would result in more distrust of the legal system as a
whole, since lawyers would be seen as quibbling over secondary is-
sues instead of pursuing real justice.90
G. Summary
Under all three of the approaches discussed above, the inad-
vertently disclosed document may be used by the receiving attor-
ney: the strict responsibility approach would allow the document to
86. Joseph S. Stuart, Inadvertent Disclosure of Confidential Information: What
Does a California Lawyer Need to Know?, 37 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 547, 561
(1997) (quoting Alldread v. City of Grenada, 988 F.2d 1425, 1434 (5th Cir. 1993)).
87. See Jones, supra note 34, at 1277 (observing that “[b]ecause of the fact-
specific nature of this test, no rule of general applicability or presumption regard-
ing waiver has evolved”).
88. Id.
89. Bruckner-Harvey, supra note 6, at 391.
90. See Jones, supra note 34, at 1257-60 (examining the reasons underlying the
public’s heightened awareness and disdain for the legal profession).
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be admitted into evidence, and the other two approaches would
allow derivative use of the document to pursue facts and leads in
preparation for trial.  None of these approaches is entirely satisfac-
tory, yet they are the approaches the courts have taken and lawyers
must take heed of whichever approach has been adopted by a par-
ticular jurisdiction.
III.  GUIDELINES GOVERNING THE RECEIVING
LAWYER’S ACTIONS
The rule of waiver adopted by a state will certainly inform the
receiving attorney’s decision regarding what to do with an inadver-
tently disclosed document, but that choice is ultimately an ethical
issue and cannot solely depend on whether waiver has occurred.
While the rules of evidence would permit or even encourage the
use of inadvertently disclosed documents, the rules of ethics may
ask that the lawyer behave differently than the rules allow.  The
ABA has issued a formal opinion91 suggesting the proper action for
the receiving attorney, and various states have issued opinions on
the same topic.  Other states have drafted standards of profession-
alism or standards governing litigation conduct.  These will be dis-
cussed in turn below.
A. The ABA Opinion
The ABA’s Formal Opinion 92-36892 begins by acknowledging
that “[a] satisfactory answer . . . cannot be drawn from a narrow,
literalistic reading of the black letter of the Model Rules.”93  The
opinion then states that the receiving lawyer should not examine
the inadvertently disclosed materials, but should notify the sending
lawyer of the mistake and follow the sending lawyer’s instructions
as to what to do with the documents.94  The ABA thus wants law-
yers to behave with restraint, forsaking the potential rewards of-
fered by the rules of evidence.  If the underlying rule were either
91. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-368
(1992), reprinted in ABA/BNA LAWYERS’ MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
155 (1996) [hereinafter Formal Op. 92-368].  This opinion addresses what to do in
the event of inadvertent disclosure of documents that “appear on their face to be
subject to the attorney-client privilege or otherwise confidential.”  Id.  This Note is
not concerned with a subsequent opinion (and commentary and state opinions) in
which the ABA addressed what an attorney should do with unsolicited, privileged
documents.
92. For a good summary of the ABA opinion, see Jones, supra note 34, at
1267-72.
93. Formal Op. 92-368, supra note 91, at 155.
94. Id.
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the no-waiver or the balancing test, the receiving attorney would be
allowed to make derivative use of the privileged document, al-
though that same document would be inadmissible as evidence.
However, the ABA also places a premium on confidentiality, and
the opinion notes that the loss of confidentiality is too high a price
for the client to pay for a lawyer’s “mere slip.”95  Without the as-
surance that documents will be kept confidential, the important
function of full and frank disclosure between the client and the at-
torney will be harmed.  The ABA’s premium on confidentiality
leads it to preclude derivative use of the document, even if it would
be inadmissible at trial.
The ABA opinion refutes the notion that the strict responsi-
bility approach will encourage lawyers to be more careful, reason-
ing that there are other incentives for attorneys to keep their cli-
ents’ secrets, including Model Rule 1.6.96  The committee also
acknowledges the “persistence of human frailty,”97 and suggests
that the threat of punishment will have no effect on whether a per-
son makes a mistake.
In response to the idea that there is nothing left to protect
once a document has been disclosed, the ABA opinion contends
that this is a moot question if the receiving attorney becomes aware
of the privileged documents before reading them.98  Even if the re-
ceiving lawyer has read the documents, the ABA maintains that
there is value in preserving whatever confidentiality remains.99
Finally, the ABA opinion emphasizes the role of professional-
ism and the idea of “what goes around comes around.”100  Although
zealous advocacy may counsel the use of inadvertently disclosed
documents, the ABA suggests there are equal advantages to doing
the opposite.101  Among these is the idea that, while the individual
lawyer may benefit from the receipt of materials in one case, he
may be the disclosing party the next time around.102  There is also
95. Jones, supra note 34, at 1268.
96. Model Rule 1.6 provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] lawyer shall not reveal
information relating to representation of a client unless the client consents after
consultation.”  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2000).
97. Formal Op. 92-368, supra note 91, at 157.
98. Id.  The ABA gives an example: “If the facsimile cover sheet says ‘to All
Defense Counsel’ and the receiving lawyer represents the plaintiff, the confidenti-
ality can be completely protected so long as the lawyer refrains from giving in to
temptation.”  Id.
99. Id.
100. Jones, supra note 34, at 1269.
101. Id. at 1268-69.
102. Formal Op. 92-368, supra note 91, at 161.
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the danger that the judge will order new proceedings upon finding
out that one party based her strategy on missent documents.103  Fi-
nally, the opinion notes that “the credibility and professionalism
inherent in doing the right thing can, in some significant ways, en-
hance the strength of one’s case, one’s standing with the other
party and opposing counsel, and one’s stature before the court.”104
The ABA’s Formal Opinion reflects the opinion of one commenta-
tor, who asserts that “[i]n an interdependent world, the only way to
ensure respect for our own commitments is to provide a similar re-
spect for the commitments of others.”105
B. Criticism of the ABA Opinion
Professor Monroe Freedman, an outspoken opponent of the
ABA view, emphasizes the lawyer’s duty to zealously represent her
client over the importance of confidentiality.106  He asserts that
Model Rule 1.6 binds the receiving lawyer to conceal receipt of
privileged or confidential documents from opposing counsel be-
cause doing otherwise would be tantamount to revealing informa-
tion relating to the representation of a client without the client’s
consent.107  Only if the client consents can the lawyer send the
document back to opposing counsel, but even then Freedman
hopes “the lawyer would first make his own determination of
whether the document is in fact privileged.”108  Even if there is a
cover sheet that names both the intended recipient and sender and
says “confidential” in bold letters across the front, Freedman ar-
gues that one cannot know a document is privileged unless one
reads it because “even a faxed invitation to lunch” is likely to have
the same information on the cover sheet.109  Ultimately, in Freed-
man’s opinion, the ABA rule “holds that you should give more
weight to your adversary’s obligation of confidentiality than to
your own obligation of zealous representation.”110
103. Id.  The ABA gives two examples.  First, a Baltimore judge ordered the
jury stricken and a new jury selection process upon learning that the plaintiff
based jury selection on a document inadvertently sent by the defendant.  Second,
the law firm of Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP withdrew from a case due
to its exposure to confidential government documents.
104. Id.
105. RHODE, supra note 24, at 12.
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C. Selected State Opinions
Various state ethics opinions generally agree with either the
ABA opinion or the view espoused by Professor Freedman.  Below
are brief examples of states that have adopted each of these com-
peting approaches.111  It should also be noted that, while the opin-
ions differ as to whether the receiving lawyer may use the docu-
ments, the opinions are uniform in requiring the receiving attorney
to notify the disclosing attorney of the mistake.  Presumably, this
maintains the fair practice of allowing each side to adequately pre-
pare for trial.
1. Virginia Legal Ethics Opinion No. 1702.  On November 24,
1997, the Virginia Ethics Committee published an opinion based
on virtually the same fact pattern as the ABA opinion.112  While ac-
knowledging there is no specific rule to guide the receiving lawyer’s
conduct, the committee stated that “[t]he absence of an explicit
Disciplinary Rule does not create an ethical vacuum.”113  Further-
more, it emphasized that legal ethics is “fraught with gray areas”
that cannot be adequately covered by rules, and that under such
circumstances, “the ethical polestar is conduct that reflects credit
on and inspires public confidence in and respect for the integrity of
the legal profession.”114  Like ABA Formal Opinion 92-368, the
Virginia opinion places a premium on confidentiality and notes
that client confidentiality “should not hinge on someone pushing
the wrong number on a facsimile machine or putting documents in
the wrong envelope.”115  Even where the opposing attorney has
read beyond the confidentiality notice on the cover page, the Vir-
111. For opinions that the receiving lawyer has no ethical duty to return the
documents, see D.C. Legal Ethics Op. 256 (1995) (advising that a lawyer may use
the documents if she read them before discovering they were privileged); Ky.
Ethics Op. E-374 (1995) (holding that a lawyer will not be punished for using in-
advertently disclosed documents); Me. Ethics Op. 146 (1984) (stating the receiving
attorney was permitted to use the documents as allowed by the rules of procedure
and evidence).
For opinions emphasizing the lawyer’s duty to notify the sender and return
the documents, see Ala. State Bar, Office of General Counsel, Informal Op.
(1996); D.C. Legal Ethics Op. 256 (1995) (advising that a lawyer should follow the
ABA opinion if she has not reviewed the materials); Fla. Bar Op. 93-3 (1994).
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ginia opinion maintains that the document should be returned once
it is deemed privileged or not intended for the lawyer.116
2. Kentucky Formal and Informal Opinions KBA E-374.  The
Kentucky opinion agrees with ABA Formal Opinion 92-368 in
stating that “when a lawyer receives materials under circumstances
in which it is clear that they were not intended for the receiving
lawyer, the lawyer should refrain from examining the materials, no-
tify the sender, and abide by the sender’s instructions regarding the
disposition of the materials.”117  However, the Kentucky opinion
makes clear that if receiving attorneys do not behave this way, they
should not be disciplined, because their loyalty is to their clients,
and not to opposing attorneys.118  Instead, lawyers are strongly en-
couraged to return the documents unread unless they believe they
can make a good faith argument that the disclosure waived the at-
torney-client privilege as to the erroneously sent documents.119
The benefit of this approach is that it maintains the allowance
of derivative use of a document under the rules of evidence while
providing an aspirational guide for lawyers who receive a docu-
ment that is clearly not for them and is clearly confidential on its
face.  Like a pro bono rule,120 lawyers are strongly encouraged to
behave a certain way, but will not be punished for failing to do so.
The Kentucky opinion emphasizes professionalism while also al-
lowing room for traditional notions of zealous advocacy, recogniz-
ing both the attorney’s ethical obligations within the profession and
professional obligations to the client.121
3. District of Columbia Legal Ethics Opinion 256.  The Dis-
trict of Columbia opinion draws sharper lines than the Kentucky
opinion depending on whether the receiving lawyer knows that the
documents are confidential.  Where there is no indication that the
document is confidential and the receiving attorney reads it in good
faith, there is no ethical violation.122  To find otherwise would place
an unreasonable burden on the receiving lawyer and would under-
mine the usual assumption that documents delivered in the normal
116. Id.
117. Ky. Formal and Informal Op. KBA E-374 (1995).
118. Id.
119. Id.  The opinion goes on to emphasize that such an argument is “made at
the risk of exclusion of evidence and disqualification.”  Id.
120. ALASKA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 6.1 cmt. (2001-2002); see also
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 6.1 cmt. 11 (2000).
121. Ky. Formal and Informal Op. KBA E-374 (1995).
122. D.C. Legal Ethics Op. 256 (1995).
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course of business are meant to be delivered.123  Under the District
of Columbia opinion, the lawyer may use the documents and the
inadvertent disclosure would constitute a waiver of the attorney-
client privilege.124  Indeed, the District of Columbia states that to
suggest otherwise would compromise the lawyer’s duty of zealous
representation and would create a conflict of interest.125
However, the District of Columbia opinion reaches a different
conclusion where it is clear that the document is confidential, and
the lawyer so knows before reading it.  Where the lawyer has
knowledge of the inadvertently disclosed document’s confidential-
ity before reading it, it is the lawyer’s ethical duty to seek the
sending attorney’s guidance and to return the material unread.126
The District of Columbia reasons that in such a case, the document
is like a wallet found on the street: if “the finder knows that it does
not belong to him, and [appropriates] to himself the wallet’s con-
tents, the finder engages in the tort of conversion.”127  Furthermore,
there would be no “disclosure,” since the receiving attorney has no
knowledge of the document’s contents.128
IV. PHILOSOPHICAL JUSTIFICATIONS
In addition to the reasoning behind the underlying policies of
the rules, various philosophical justifications can be advanced in
favor of particular approaches to inadvertent disclosure situations.
For purposes of brevity, and because the utilitarian justification
was touched on above in discussing the strict responsibility ap-
proach,129 this Note will examine only two:  a pragmatic, utilitarian
theory of justice, and the theory of distributive justice.
A.  Pragmatism
In the legal world, pragmatism’s most famous advocate is
Oliver Wendell Holmes.  The school of Legal Realism, an applica-







129. See supra Parts II.A and II.B.
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tial in American legal theory130 and has also enjoyed a recent resur-
gence in legal scholarship.131
Under the pragmatic view of law, the debate about who is
“right” and who is “wrong” in any universal sense of those words
would be abandoned, and instead the focus would be on the practi-
cal results of competing positions.132  The pragmatist “turns away
from abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal solutions, from bad
a priori reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems, and pre-
tended absolutes and origins.”133  Instead, the pragmatist turns “to-
wards concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards action,
and towards power.”134  In other words, pragmatism does not “ab-
stract persons and issues from the flow of history . . . so that real-
world issues can be reduced to problems in a moral algebra.”135
Under this rubric, one could argue that a guideline based on
the ABA opinion is justified because the practical results are more
beneficial to the legal system as a whole than allowing the receiving
party to keep and use the documents.  Not only would client confi-
dences be protected against the everyday slips caused by human
frailty, but also the goal of societal trust in the system would be fur-
thered.  Moreover, a higher standard of professionalism would re-
sult; the outcome of cases would depend on the relative strength of
the parties and the skill of the attorneys within the adversarial sys-
tem, rather than luck or misfortune.  Expenses would also de-
crease, as the need to litigate over inadvertent disclosure and at-
torney behavior would decrease.
B.  Distributive Justice
Another relevant ethical position is that of John Rawls’s the-
ory of distributive justice. The theory of distributive justice asks the
individual to remove him or herself from the fray of interested be-
havior and decide what would be the best way in which to obtain
justice for the greatest number of people.  While not a legal theory,
per se, it is a way of approaching the creation of legal rules and
forming solid policy grounds for their enactment.
130. See, e.g., KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH (1930); Roscoe Pound,
A Call For a Realist Jurisprudence, 44 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1930); Oliver Wendell
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 467 (1897).
131. See, e.g., STANLEY FISH, THE TROUBLE  WITH PRINCIPLE (1999); RICHARD
POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE (1990).
132. See William James, What Pragmatism Means, in PRAGMATISM 93, 94-96
(Louis Menand ed., 1997).
133. Id. at 97.
134. Id.
135. STANLEY FISH, THERE’S NO SUCH THING AS FREE SPEECH 11 (1994).
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The goal for Rawls is not a uniform moral state, but one which ac-
tually avoids “disputed philosophical, as well as disputed moral and
religious, questions . . . not because these questions are unimpor-
tant or regarded with indifference, but because we think them too
important and recognize that there is no way to resolve them po-
litically.”136  Because of the divergence of views, and the difficulty
in resolving them politically, Rawls finds it wise to
focus on such questions and to examine whether some underly-
ing basis of agreement can be uncovered and a mutually accept-
able way of resolving these questions [can be] publicly estab-
lished.  Or if [they] cannot be fully settled, as may well be the
case, perhaps the divergence of opinion can be narrowed suffi-
ciently so that political cooperation on a basis of mutual respect
can still be maintained.137
In order to find a mutually acceptable way of arriving at basic prin-
ciples that will govern a society, Rawls uses the theoretical device
of the original position, in which all parties are behind a “veil of ig-
norance.”138  The veil of ignorance is meant to remove “the bar-
gaining advantages which inevitably arise within background insti-
tutions of any society as the result of cumulative social, historical,
and natural tendencies,” because these tendencies “should not in-
fluence an agreement on the principles which are to regulate the
institutions of the basic structure itself from the present into the fu-
ture.”139  The veil of ignorance prevents one from knowing what
one’s future position in society will be.  Because bargaining posi-
tions are eliminated, one must act so as to narrow the diversion of
religious, moral, or philosophical positions in such a way that the
least amount of discord will result.
In applying this view to the receiving attorney’s decision as to
how to handle a privileged document not meant for her, one is
placed in the position of possibly being the inadvertently disclosing
attorney or client where use of the document would lead to an un-
fair result and public distrust of the system.  In such a circumstance,
it becomes clear that a rule such as that announced in ABA Opin-
ion 92-368 would seem most desirable.  Asking that the receiving
attorney not read or use the document, and notify the disclosing
party of its mistake becomes a useful baseline from which attorneys
can evaluate the circumstances and act in a way that would best
serve all interests from behind the veil of ignorance.
136. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical, in KEY
CONCEPTS IN CRITICAL THEORY: JUSTICE 48, 53 (Milton Fisk ed. 1993).
137. Id. at 50.
138. Id. at 57.
139. Id.
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Of course, one could also argue from the theory of distributive
justice that the person who would be worst off is the party whose
lawyer does not believe in her case and is not taking the role of ad-
vocate seriously.  For example, a criminal defendant with an ap-
pointed attorney would want the rules to be such that his lawyer
should read the inadvertently disclosed document, even if it would
be inadmissible under the waiver rules.  An ethical rule asking the
attorney to return the document unread is giving that attorney yet
another chance to fail in her duty of zealous advocacy on behalf of
her client.  In other words, it is an invitation for the lawyer to shirk
her duty to the client in favor of a nebulous ethical goal.
This criticism is not entirely fair, however.  Just because law-
yers are asked not to read inadvertently disclosed documents does
not mean they do not take their clients’ cases seriously.  Moreover,
if lawyers are open to shirking their duties in representing their cli-
ents, they will do so even in the absence of a rule asking them not
to read inadvertently disclosed documents.  Such disclosures are
not the norm, so the assumption that asking an attorney not to read
an inadvertently disclosed document also asks her to ignore her
duty of zealous advocacy does not recognize that advocacy encom-
passes far more than reading confidential documents from the op-
posing side.  Indeed, many cases run their full course without any-
one encountering this particular ethical problem.  Asking a lawyer
to refrain from reading an inadvertently disclosed document is not
the same as asking a lawyer to shirk her duty of zealous advocacy.
Furthermore, these situations involve documents that a lawyer
would not have access to under normal circumstances; lawyers are
as free to advocate on behalf of their clients within the confines of
ethical rules and substantive law as they would have been had the
document never been disclosed.  Also, by establishing a reputation
for “doing the right thing,” one also establishes a reputation for
being more than a mere “hired gun” who is paid to say whatever
the client wishes.
But the “hired gun” view is not uncommon.  This view man-
dates use of the document for a lawyer who ostensibly has the cli-
ent’s interests in mind.  The hired gun approach assumes that the
lawyer’s role is subsumed into the client’s wishes.  In other words,
the lawyer remains “neutral,” and the “moral task is to act in such
a way as to protect clients from the influence of others, so that cli-
ents will make their own moral rules, be their own rulers.”140
140. THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS,
AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 17 (1994).  The hired gun view was famously stated
by Lord Brougham in the 1821 trial of Queen Caroline:
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However, this view is not universally accepted, and it grants
too much weight to zealous representation without regard to a law-
yer’s obligation to the legal system as a whole.  Although the claim
is that the “hired gun” view is neutral,
[t]o decline to take a moral stance is in itself a moral stance and
requires justification as such.  Thus the critical question is not by
what right do lawyers impose their views, but by what right do
they evade the responsibility of all individuals to evaluate the
normative implications of their acts?  Alternatively, by what
right do clients circumscribe counsels’ ethical duty?141
As a result, the hired gun attorney is, at best, a divided person, and
at worst, one with ready-made excuses for immoral behavior.142
One can think of cases where we would not want lawyers to substi-
tute their own personal discretion for that of their clients.  For ex-
ample, one would hope that an attorney whose underage female
client asks to be placed in a mentally, physically, or sexually abu-
sive home would refuse the request.  Perhaps this is “shirking”
one’s duty for ill-defined ethical principles, but it may also be the
best result for that client.  In other words, lawyers can be zealous
advocates on behalf of their clients without subsuming their own
morality into that of their clients.
V.  PROPOSED GUIDELINE FOR ALASKA
Neither the Alaska courts nor the Alaska Bar Association has
had occasion to officially consider the issues presented by inadver-
tent disclosure of privileged documents.143  In accordance with prin-
ciples of confidentiality, professionalism, and zealous advocacy, as
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all
the world, and that person is his client.  To save that client by all means
and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and,
amongst them, to himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing
this duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction
which he may bring upon others.
Id. at 18.
141. Id. at 28-29 (quoting Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal
Practice, 37 STAN. L. REV. 589, 623 (1985)).
142. Id. at 29.
143. However, the Alaska Bar Association has considered the question of
whether an attorney is required to notify opposing counsel upon receipt of privi-
leged information where the disclosure was intentional.  In Ethics Opinion No. 97-
1 (1997), a wife in a divorce case purposely sent her husband’s attorney confiden-
tial documents without informing her attorney.  Because the wife had acted inten-
tionally, there was no inadvertent disclosure and no obligation arose on the part of
the husband’s attorney to inform opposing counsel of the wife’s actions.  The
Alaska Bar Association, however, explicitly declined to express an opinion on the
duties of a receiving attorney in an inadvertent disclosure situation.  Id.
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well as the various philosophical points of view discussed above,
Alaska would be wise to adopt a general non-binding guideline,
much like that expressed in Kentucky’s Opinion E-374, in which
the receiving lawyer is strongly encouraged to return the docu-
ments unread.  Although the underlying evidence rule of privilege
may allow derivative use of the document, the ethical rule would
ask the lawyer to refrain from doing so where it is clear that the
document is not intended for her and where it is facially clear that
the document is confidential.  Against the backdrop of the balanc-
ing test approach to inadvertent waiver of the attorney-client
privilege, such an approach would allow the most nuance, fairness,
and respect for all participants in the legal system.
A. The Underlying Rule of Waiver
When framing the proper approach for Alaska, one must take
into account the underlying rule of waiver against which the ethical
considerations will function.  Rules of waiver often conflict with
guidelines that govern the behavior of the receiving attorney.
If the state adopts the strict responsibility approach, the re-
ceiving lawyer is essentially absolved of any responsibility and has
no incentive to return the document or even notify her adversary.
If the strict responsibility approach is adopted, a rule requiring no-
tification should also be adopted in order to avoid any surprises in
the litigation process.  Since the receiving lawyer can use the
document, it is only fair to notify the attorney who inadvertently
disclosed the document that it is going to be used at trial, so that
the attorney can alter her strategy to fit the new situation.
Adoption of the strict responsibility approach would require
Alaska to change its rules surrounding waiver of the attorney client
privilege and the work product privilege.  Currently, the Alaska
Rules of Professional Conduct assert that the “attorney-client
privilege is that of the client and not of the lawyer.”144  If Alaska
chose the strict responsibility approach, it would de-emphasize the
client’s intent in waiving the attorney-client privilege, and allow the
attorney to waive it through mere negligence.  The strict responsi-
bility approach would have the benefit of clarity, would provide
clear guidelines to lawyers about their duties upon receiving inad-
vertently disclosed documents, and would allow attorneys greater
leeway to be zealous advocates on behalf of their clients.
The strict responsibility approach also has broad complica-
tions.  A missent fax is only one way for a lawyer to disclose a
document inadvertently.  What if a lawyer mistakenly leaves a con-
144. ALASKA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Scope (1999).
SIMKO_FINAL.DOC 11/06/02  9:39 AM
488 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [19:2
fidential document on the table in opposing counsel’s building after
a deposition?  Does it matter if the document is in a folder?  A
sealed envelope?  A briefcase?  One could argue, along Professor
Freedman’s lines, that the lawyer has to look inside the briefcase
and read the documents before she can know to whom they belong
and whether they are confidential.145  Of course, even if the brief-
case were left, the “finding” attorney would have to ask her client
before she could even notify the “leaving” attorney, and even then
she cannot return it without her client’s permission.  This surely is
too ridiculous a result to let stand.  It also does not take adequate
notice of human frailty and the practical reality that lawyers prac-
tice in a fast-paced environment, sometimes with hundreds of thou-
sands of documents and often with the assistance of support staff
who may not possess legal training or knowledge of the relevant
ethics rules.  Sometimes things will be missed or forgotten.  The
strict responsibility rule would do nothing to prevent such actions,
because the actions are inadvertent in the first place.  Even the
most assiduous of attorneys will make mistakes sometimes.  The
harshest of punishments cannot make them more careful, and this
rule would punish attorneys for being nothing more than human.
Ironically, Freedman’s emphasis on the client of the receiving at-
torney ignores the client of the sending attorney.  Furthermore,
Freedman also ignores the tension between the lawyer’s obligation
to zealously represent her client with the rules limiting the extent
to which the lawyer can exercise that duty.146
Also, the notion that the recipient cannot know a document is
confidential or not intended for her without reading it is overly
simplistic.  If the usual “To” and “From” are on the cover sheet,
one would not have to get past the top page of the document to
know it was not intended for her.  Once this is discovered, there is
no reason to keep reading, even if it is something as mundane as a
lunch invitation—unless, of course, zealous advocacy overrides the
common sense notion that one should not read what is not in-
tended for her.
If Alaska adopted the no waiver approach to inadvertent dis-
closure, it would likewise have the benefit of clarity.  But, like the
strict responsibility approach, the no waiver rule fails to account for
the nuances of different levels of care and lacks incentives for the
receiving attorney to notify her adversary of receipt of the docu-
ment.  If the receiving lawyer knows the document will not be al-
lowed into evidence, there is no reason for her not to glean as
145. Freedman, supra note 17, at 45.
146. Formal Op. 92-368, supra note 91, at 155.
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much information as possible to help prepare an opposing strategy
for trial.
While imperfect, the balancing test approach is the best option
to use to frame such a rule.  The difficulty in writing an ethical rule
with the balancing test in the background is the tension between
the elements of the test and the potential avenues of conduct for
the receiving lawyer.  The receiving lawyer may not wish to reveal
that she has the document, and may not seek judicial review of the
situation.  If the disclosing attorney is still unaware of the mistake,
she will not be able to raise the issue with the court unless she
learns of the disclosure from a means other than opposing counsel.
While this argument has some power, it actually illustrates one in-
stance where the disclosing attorney may have waived the privilege
under the balancing test.  The implication is that making a rule re-
quiring the receiving attorney to notify the disclosing attorney of
the mistake is unnecessary, since the burden is on the disclosing at-
torney to recognize and rectify the error.
In the end, however, no matter what approach the court takes
to waiver, it will not be able to provide adequate incentives to in-
fluence attorney behavior in favor of not reading and returning the
document.  That incentive can be provided only by an ethical rule,
which will suffer tension with the evidentiary allowance and even
encouragement of derivative use of the inadvertently disclosed
document.
B. Proposed Guideline for Alaska
Oddly enough, the best rule is no rule at all.147  Alaska should
adopt a non-binding guideline outlining a general set of expecta-
tions for attorney conduct during the course of litigation.  This
guideline would be based on the ABA’s recommendation that
states adopt a Lawyer’s Creed of Professionalism.148  As noted
above, any binding rule requiring a lawyer to refrain from reading
an inadvertently disclosed document would conflict with the evi-
dentiary rules of privilege that allow at least derivative use of such
147. See generally Jones, supra note 34 and accompanying text.
148. ABA Standing Comm. on Professionalism, Annual Meeting 1995, Rec-
ommendation and Report.  The Standing Committee recommended that states
adopt standards by which lawyers recognize a duty to both clients and to a system
of justice, a duty of fairness and cooperation to all parties involved in the litiga-
tion, and to “a higher level of conduct than observance of rules of professional
conduct.”  Id.  These standards would be aspirational, and “the recommendation
encourages practicing lawyers and the judiciary to identify standards that go be-
yond the mere upholding of law and ethics rules and codes that sanction miscon-
duct.”  Id.
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a document.  One would have to rewrite the rules of privilege alto-
gether if a binding rule requiring such professional conduct were
enacted.  Therefore, a non-binding guideline such as those in the
ABA’s Model Guidelines for Litigation Conduct149 is the best solu-
tion.  An alternative would be a non-binding rule, placed in the
Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct.  While one could argue such
a guideline would be a waste of time and resources because lawyers
would not follow it, it would serve to create norms of behavior and
a reference point of what considerations should undergird a law-
yer’s decision-making process.150  In this way, an ethical guideline is
not unlike a pro-bono rule, which asks a lawyer to donate a certain
number of hours to the public interest, but does not require disci-
plinary enforcement of the rule.  A few states have suggested that
standards on professionalism and courtesy be established.151
A non-binding guideline would have other advantages over a
rule imposing sanctions.  A non-binding guideline allows lawyers to
be curious without putting them in the awkward position of facing
disciplinary sanctions.  Also, it avoids the messiness of having an
ethical rule that requires return and an evidentiary rule that may
allow use.  Furthermore, negligent lawyers are still put on notice
that they may suffer because of acts that are negligent, and lawyers
on the receiving side are encouraged to send inadvertently dis-
closed materials back unread.  A non-binding guideline gives a
lawyer encouragement for restraint without increasing litigation
and professional complications if that encouragement is unheeded.
149. ABA, Guidelines for Litigation Conduct, Aug. 1998.
150. One should not underestimate the power of norms to influence attorney
decision-making.  Lawyers conform to the actions they see played out in their day-
to-day practice.  In one study, lawyers ranked collegial practices as the second
most significant factor in resolving questions of professional responsibility.
RHODE, supra note 24, at 42-43 (citing FRAN ZEMANS & VICTOR ROSENBLUM,
THE MAKING OF A PUBLIC PROFESSION (1984)).
151. See, e.g., Committee on Federal Courts, Association of the Bar of the City
of New York, A Proposed Code of Litigation Conduct, 43 REC. OF THE ASS’N OF
THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 738, 739 (1988) (discussing how the commit-
tee sought to move beyond merely “following the rules” to instill conduct that fos-
tered good relationships between attorneys, among attorneys and clients, and be-
tween attorneys and judges).  Part B(K) of the proposed New York code states
that “[e]ffective advocacy does not require antagonistic or obnoxious behavior
and members of the Bar will adhere to the higher standard of conduct which
judges, lawyers, clients, and the public may rightfully expect.”  Id.  The standards
go on to say that “[t]hose litigators who persist in viewing themselves solely as
combatants, or who perceive that they are retained to win at all costs without re-
gard to fundamental principles of justice, will find that their conduct does not
square with the practices we expect of them.”  Id.
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A non-binding guideline is a way for lawyers to make appropriate
compromises, avoid litigation, and build respect for the profession.
When thinking about a guideline, it is useful to:  (1) look at
how other states have addressed the issue; (2) use the Alaska Rules
of Professional Conduct as a reference point; and (3) keep in mind
the values of professionalism, confidentiality, and zealous advo-
cacy, without letting one value unreasonably outweigh the others.
Alaska has adopted the Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct.152  Therefore, there should be some reference to the Model
Rules if Alaska looks to frame a guideline for its own attorneys.
While there is no explicit rule guiding what the receiving lawyer
should do, the overall principles embodied in the Alaska Rules and
Commentary imply that the receiving attorney has a professional
duty to do essentially what ABA Formal Opinion 92-368 suggests:
refrain from reading the documents, notify the sender, and follow
the sender’s instructions about how to proceed.  For example, the
Preamble to the Alaska Rules of Professional Conduct candidly
states that the rules are not exhaustive, nor could they be: “The
Rules do not, however, exhaust the moral and ethical considera-
tions that should inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human activity
can be completely defined by legal rules.  The Rules simply provide
a framework for the ethical practice of law.”153  Moreover, the Pre-
amble asserts that lawyers “should demonstrate respect for the le-
gal system and for those who serve it, including judges, other law-
yers and public officials.”154  The implication is that acting ethically
is more than simply following the rules; it is acting in a way that re-
spects all the participants in the legal arena.  Therefore, while the
rules of evidence may permit derivative use of an inadvertently dis-
closed document, an aspirational ethical guideline may suggest that
the lawyer refrain from doing so.
VI.  CONCLUSION
The role played by lawyers in society goes beyond mere advo-
cacy on behalf of a client to that of a policy maker and an embodi-
ment of the legal profession to outside eyes.  There is a practical in-
terest in fostering legal ethics so that lawyers treat their clients and
their adversaries with professionalism, courtesy, and respect, even
while maintaining high standards of zealous advocacy within the
framework of adversarial litigation.  When an attorney is faced
with an inadvertently sent document that is privileged on its face, it
152. ALASKA RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT Preamble, Scope.
153. Id. Scope.
154. Id. Preamble.
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serves the legal profession, the client, and the lawyer’s interest if
the lawyer refrains from using the document, notifies the adversary
of the mistake, and follows the adversary’s instructions as to what
to do with the document.  While a black letter rule would be too
difficult to frame and enforce, especially against the background of
the underlying waiver laws, a non-binding guideline to foster legal
ethical norms by which the attorney can make decisions is a good
way for Alaska to address the problem. Until lawyers take their
professional conduct seriously, they will continue to be seen as no
more than hired guns, and as technology takes us further into the
world of fast-paced litigation and more documents are inadver-
tently disclosed, the lawyer will be seen as a mere puppet of the cli-
ent.  Establishing a guideline for higher ethical action than that re-
quired by the rules of evidence  and the rules of professional
conduct would be a wise choice for Alaska.
Joshua K. Simko 
